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Preface and Acknowledgments

I hope that this book contributes to a better understanding of the interconnection between morality and economic behavior. It is intended for those whose
interests lie in legal theory, economic theory, moral philosophy, and political
theory and for those who are concerned with ascertaining a moral basis for
pluralistic, private property democracies. I also hope that the theoretical results
of this work will prove useful to policy analysts, judges, legislators, and those
involved in developing constitutions for emerging democracie .
Several perplexities, hunches, and heuristically fruitful concepts served to
focus my interest in the moral conditions of economic efficiency. I first became
interested in this issue while reading Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral Sentiments. It seemed to me then that there was a closer connection between morality and market behavior in Smith's writings than was made
explicit. I am sympathetic to and inspired by what I believe is the intent of Jules
Coleman's Risks and Wrongs and of David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. A
pluralistic democracy having a private property economy needs some common
morality that respects a pluralism of moral traditions, is capable of guiding the
common life of all, and underwrites its legal system . But, at the time, the relationship between morality and markets seemed to need greater clarification before competing tradition could come to any "agreement" or "rational choice
contract." Since an overarching issue is social behavior, it seemed that some account of social behavior must be thrown into the mix as well. I found myself
intrigued by Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion of a social practice but enlightened
by Ronald Koshoshek's views of the ame.
Musing over these perplexities, hunches, and concept led to a closer examination of the presuppositions of the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare
conomic (or First Welfare Theorem), which is a preci e version of Adam
Smith's invisible hand . Simplifying as umptions cannot be avoided in social
science. But sometimes it pays to reexamine tho ea umption to ee wheth r
they can be expanded to cover other contributing factors. The more I considered the assumptions of the Fir t Welfare Theorem and what they were up-
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po ed to accomplish, especially in view of Smith's moral theorizing and preEnlightenment views of property, the more I wa drawn by the intuition that
morality made economic efficiency possible for autonomous people.
I am grateful for the help I have received from several individual . From Ronald
Koshoshek I acquired the background framework of concepts for understanding social behavior that informed this project. Furthermore, his expert and forthright advice was instrumental in my being interested in moral rights and their
relationship to economic analysis in the first place.
I am indebted to Daniel Johnson and William Thedinga for our weekly colloquium and for detailed written comments on several entire drafts. This work
involves concepts and jargon germane to moral philosophy, economics, and
law. There is always a risk of mi understanding and misrepre entation when
one adopts the specialized language of each the e fields while addre ing oneself to a problem common to all. Their ensitivity to the nuances of those languages and wonderful facility with correct Engli h doubtle ly contributed
greatly to the clarity of the finished project and to the acce ibility of it idea
to non-expert . Any conceptual errors or tylistic odditie that occur in the manu cript are there becau e I ignored their advice.
For the uncompromi ing preci ion and thoroughness that Norman Dahl and
Leonid Hurwicz bowed in commenting on earlier draft ; for the intellectual
timulation and multidi ciplinary experti e of Norman Bowie; and for the editorial comments, ugge tion , and enthu ia tic upport of Peg Brewington, I am
deeply grateful.
A Cedarville Univer ity Faculty Re earch Stipend enabled me to dedicate
everal month olely to thi project.
But more than any, I thank my dear pou e and be t friend, Mary, who in the
operation of her bu ine ha alway ob erved the moral normative con traint
di cu ed herein, who ha upported thi project in countle way , and who i
happier than I am to ee it fini bed.

The Moral Conditions of Economic Efficiency

1
Introduction and Synopsis

Thi work i a rigorou analy i of the moral condition of economic efficiency
and the e two central que tion focu it argument:

Question 1. Can a population of strict rational egoists achieve efficient
allocations of commodities through market interaction in the absence of
moral normative constraints?

If not, then we mu t a k:
Question -i. What are the moral normative constraints and other types
of normative conditions of market interaction leading to efficient outcomes? 1
Adam Smith's o-called Invisible Hand Claim has been subject to two centuries of theorization that has intensified in the la t two decade . Yet in thi time
we have not achieved any consen u on the possible moral condition of economic efficiency. My analysis provides a way to frame the is ue rigorou ly and
to an wer the two central que tion .
The fir t que tion define my fir t ta k: to determine whether economically
efficient outcome of market interaction require moral (in contradistinction to
legal) normative con traint ; that i , whether the con traint needed for efficiency are normative, moral, and rational. I will demon trate that efficient outcomes of market interaction cannot be achieved without a y tern of moral normative constraints for ecuring competitive behavior and a et of convention
for facilitating exchange, for coordinating upply and demand, and for internalizing certain type of externalitie . After thi i e tabli hed, the econd que tion define my second goal: to specify a et of normative condition that make
efficient outcome of trade possible.
An wen, to the e central que tion affect not only ba ic concept in economic theory but also fields for which economic analysi is important, includ-
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ing legal theory, moral philosophy, political theory, and policy analy is.2 The
concepts - market, perfect competition, perfectly competitive market, externality, and the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economic - are all affected by answers to these que tions. Both moral philo ophy and political theory gain by taking the concepts and technique of economic analysi into
consideration. Appeals court judge and policy analy ts often use economic efficiency as a factor in their decisions and propo als. Since, as I will how, economic efficiency requires moral normative constraints, such decision and proposals mu t not undercut the moral conditions of economic efficiency.
This analysis requires clarifying some central concept and making appropriate di tinctions where nece ary. There are two types of normative condition of efficiency: normative constraints and conventions. In general, a n_Q!"mative constraint is a limit on an a ent's ~ange of pos ible actions and i
constituted by a behavioral rule ang a_ u:ffjcient incentive to comply. Normative con traints can be either proscriptive or pre criptive. I will ay more about
normative con traint in the next ection by contra ting it with morality. A convention, on the other hand, could be de cribed a a coordinating rule. A regularity in ocial behavior emerge when each individual ob erve a convention
by virtue of an incentive given by in trumental (or practical) rationality alone.
For example, the convention of grammar guide the u e of a common language
and enable communication. Communication would fail without uch convention . Economically efficient outcome of trade require both normative constraint and convention .
I pecify a et of normative condition , which I demon trate to be not only
nece ary but al o u~cient in theory for efficient outcome of trade. The e
normative condition are moral in nature. And I will how that moral norm or
rule alone are not ufficient. Some type of enforcement i al o nece ary. I
how that the only uch mechani mi an internal incentive to comply with rule .
In the real world, moral norm are not perfectly ob erved. Where moral norm
are violated in the real world due to uch thing a weakne of will, ociopathology, or a mi under tanding of the moral nature of trade, a legal y tern of ome ort can upplement moral norm . However, a legal y tern by itelf i not ufficient for efficiency. I will how that a legal y tern cannot replace
moral normative con traint . Therefore, to the extent that the moral condition
I pecify are not met, re ource are wa ted enforcing compliance and rectifying the re ult of non-compliance.
In pite of their importance, definite an wer to the e central que tion much le any kind of con en u - have proved elu ive ever since 1776 when
Adam Smith in hi book, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations, claimed that when each per on pur ue hi or her own intere t they
are together led a if by an invisible hand to achieve the common good. Such
an achievement require convention , but doe it al o require moral normative
con traint ? mith (1776: 456) write ,
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A every individual, therefore, endeavors as much as he can both to employ hi capital
in the upport of dome tic industry, and o to direct that industry that its produce may
be of the greate t value; every individual nece arily labors to render the annual revenue
of the ociety a great a he can. He generally, indeed neither intends to promote the public intere t, nor knows how much he i promoting it. By preferring the upport of dome tic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that
indu try in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only
his own gain, and he i in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of hi intention [emphasis added].

It appear that it wa not Smith's intention to determine whether, much les
which moral normative constraints are required. However, it i certainly understandable that many have understood Smith to assert that, without moral normative constraints, as long as an economic agent "intends only his own security" and "only his own gain" (emphasis added) that agents will promote ome
type of common good. That is to say, it i understandable how the claim that legal or moral normative con traints are not nece ary could be made on the
grounds of Adam Smith's references to an "invisible hand." 3 However, Smith
(1776:687) seem to sugge t that there is a role for normative con traints in hi
"obviou and simple system of natural liberty." "Natural liberty" is defined by
the absence of governmental interference and by a proviso: "as long as he does
not violate the laws of justice [emphasis added], [every man] is left perfectly
free to pursue his own interest hi qwn way, and to bring both his industry and
capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men." Neverthele , Smith does not here indicate what he means by "the law of justice."
or doe he even mention them until Book IV, Chapter IX, far removed from
his invisible-hand statement. In his earlier work, Lectures on Jurisprudence
(1763: 7), Smith writes,
The first and chief design of all civill [ ic] governments, i , a I observed, to pre erve
ju tice amongst the member of the tate and prevent all incroachments [sic] on the individualls [sic] in it, from others of the same ociety. - {That is, to maintain each individual in his perfect rights.}

Smith divides the et of "perfect rights" into two ub ets: natural right and acquired right . Natural rights are right per ons hold by virtue of being per on .
atural right are moral right . Acquired rights are right held by virtue of citizenship. evertheless, even acquired rights have their basi in morality. Smith
(1763: 401) refers to his A Theory of Moral Sentiments in hi account of the origin of the state to its ground in moral psychology. Thu , for Smith, the " law of
justice" are moral presupposition of positive law.
everthele s, Smith doe not how whether or how morality affect the
workings of the lnvi ible Hand. It appear that' Smith him elf may have re ogmzed that the role of normative con traints in hi ''sy tern of natural liberty"
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was not adequately developed in eitherj_he fir t edition of the Wealth of Nations
or in the earlier A Theory of Moral Sentiments, for he spent the last year of his
life revising these works to show how the invisible hand is insufficient without
morality. 4 I have dealt at length with Adam Smith becaµse it eems that the lack
of clarity regarding answers to our central que tions can be traced back at least
that far.
Contemporary writers who advert to Adam Smith likewi e are unclear about
the role and specifics of normative constraints for efficient outcomes of market
interaction. I am not suggesting that Smith and those who refer to him were attempting to determine whether and which normative constraints are required
for efficient outcomes of market interaction. I am drawing attention to how an
understanding that efficient outcomes of trade do not require moral normative
con traints could be drawn from Smith and other . Con ider the account given
by Friedman:
Adam Smith's flash of geniu wa his recognition that the price that emerged from voluntary tran action between buyer and eller - for hort, in a free market - could coordinate the activity of million of people, each eeking hi own intere t, in uch a way
as to make everyone better off. It wa a tartling idea then , and it remain one today, that
economic order can emerge a the unintended con equence of the actions of many people, each eeking hi own intere t. (1980:13-4)

It i not clear whether Friedman think normative con traint are e ential for
economically efficient allocation of commoditie . The clo est Friedman
come to citing anything like normative con traint i the idea that tran actions
mu t be voluntary. Th~ concept of voluntary exchange i es ential in depicting
efficient outcome of trade, but Friedman doe not pecify what he mean by
the term "voluntary." Fiiedman indicate that voluntarine
hould be een primarily a a lack of tate coercion - even though he once mention that robbery
i a type of coercion, and once he indicate that people may be coerced by invader from other nation . But Friedman doe not indicate which pecific type
of normative con traint are required to preclude the e kind of detrimental actions and to en ure that exchange are voluntary. In all fairne to Friedman, I
mu t reiterate that it i not hi explicit intention to pecify both the exact meaning of voluntarine and what pecific kind of constraint voluntarine implie .5 The point i imply that Friedman i not clear regarding both the role and
the specific kind of normative con traint in market interaction. Hi lack of
clarity may depend upon the lack of clarity regarding the notion of a voluntary
exchange.
Furthermore, few if any proof of the Fir t Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economic (which i commonly under tood to be a proof of the Invi ible
Hand Claim) explicitly indicate the type and role of a y tern of normative condition who e effect they pre uppo e. Furthermore, the Fir t Welfare Theorem
along with it a umption regarding agent has served as a point of departure
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for legal theory, economic analysis, and moral philosophy in the last two
decade of the twentieth century. We have gotten thi far in our theorizing without fir t having achieved ome kind of consensus on the moral conditions of
economic efficiency.

Morality, Moral Rules, and Normative Constraints
There i al o a persi tent lack of clarity and of consensu among scholars in philosophy, in economics, and in legal theory regarding some concepts crucial to
the central questions we face. Thus, to an wer our central que tions with sufficient preci ion, I must stipulate my u e of essential terms.
At thi point, the concepts of morality and of a normative constraint mu st be
differentiated. In thi book, morality is understood to be a normative ocial practice, which is a social phenomenon - a regularity in social behavior -(1) guided
by belief held in common concerning (a) the criteria by which a group of individuals evaluate their own and others' behavior and according to which criteria they hold each other responsible and (b) the procedures for holding each
other responsible, and (2) the purpose of which is directly pertinent to individuals ' well-being taken individually and collectively.
The criteria that guide a morality can be rules, norms, or even simple expectations. I u e the terms interchangeably even though there are conceptual
differences. A person may expect, for instance, that others will not engage in
some kinds of 6ehavior, yet it may ·never have occurred to her to view her expectation as being expressible by rule guiding the behavior of others. Only the
notion of criteria guiding behavior is primary. How those criteria themselves
are conceptualized is not essential to my argument.
What makes a rule a moral rule i partially a matter of its fun ction in achieving and ustaining well-being through a social practice, where the content of a
conception of well-being is dependent on the commonly held belief of its correlative community's member .6 Generally speaking, a particul ar community's
concept of well-being depend on what that community values and how it under tands reality, human beings, and the cause of thwarted ideals. Accordingly,
to under tand the rationale for a moral rule is to understand its relation to these
beliefs and to the conception of well-being as ociated with them.
Furthermore, since a norm, rule, or expectation i moral due to its function
in securing a conception of well-being, it follow that what some groups take
to be merely a tandard of etiquette, others may under tand morally - a functioning, that i , to secure well-being. Similarly, what some group under tand
to be both legal and moral, other may under tand to be legal but not moral ,
such as the uremberg laws in azi Germany or the Apartheid law in pre-democratic South Africa. urther, an obligation to obey the law may be understood
by some group a a moral obligation. Others might believe that a o-called obligation to obey the law i a conceptual mistake or even a redundant7 legal but
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not moral obligation. In hort, the moral i whatever a particular group sees a
uch.
Kant's rationale which is supposed to distingui h a rule of morality from a
rule of prudence, is an a priori demonstration. Bu~ perhap the difference
among a convention, a prudential rule of thumb, and a moral rule are better determined by reference to the types of grounds cited in a rationale. For example,
a request for a rationale for a particular convention might elicit the following
response:
"That's ju t the way we do it, that's all. Probably no one know why."
A rationale for a rule of prudence might go like this:
"If you want to achieve Y, everyone know that doing Xi the only or the
be t way."

A rationale for a moral rule might, on reflection, refer the interlocutor to what
has value, or some feature of human nature.
Thi account of the moral take the fact of cultural relativi m into con ideration. Moralitie and their criteria are ocially con tructed. However, to ay that
such criteria are ocially con tructed i not to deny what ome group and tradition hold to be e ential about their moral norm . It is not to deny, that i ,
that their moral rule are either natural law or God-ordained. It i logically po ible that the e claim could be true. If o, then the particular ocial practice
guided by uch rule i_ hi torically ituated and take on the nuance of that ituation. Cultural relativi m doe not imply cognitive relativi m.
To reiterate, morality i a ocial practice guided by moral rule , which in turn
are identified a uch by virtue of how compliance achieve and u tain communally defined well-being. How, then, doe morality and moral rule relate to
normative con traint? In the mo t general en e, a constraint i ome device that
effectively inhibit ome type of action from occurring. In economic model of
market interaction agent typically face two kind of con traint : po itive contraint and normative con traint .8
Positive constraints delimit a et of phy ically po ible action . For example, the value of the et of commoditie an agent pre ently hold i her budget
con traint. It value (given in term of an exchange ratio with other commoditie ) et a limit on alternative et of commoditie for which it can be traded .
For a implified example, if Alice ha two fi h and the value of one fi h i either two loave of bread or one ba ket of fruit, Alice may trade her fi h for four
loave of bread, for two ba ket of fruit, or for two loave of bread and one ba ket of fruit - but no more. Even though - a we hall ee in Chapter 2 - agent
in thi model prefer a et of commoditie having a higher value than the value
of the et they pre ently hold , they cannot purcha e uch a et. That i , they are
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po itively (or objectively) prevented from taking an action not because of an
enforced rule, but by virtue of a con traint they are powerles to violate.
In contra t, normative constraints constitute a broad cla of all non po itive
con traint . Normative con traint limit an agent's range of possible action and
are con tituted by a norm and a ufficient incentive to comply. Normative constraint involve rules, norms, or behavioral expectation held in common by a
group of people, but a normative constraint mu t be di tingui hed from a rule,
norm, and expectation. A rule pro cribing ome type of action i not, by itself,
a normative con traint. A rule merely expresse a pro cription or pre cription
of ome ort. A linguistic expres ion of a prohibition i not sufficient by itself
to preclude the prohibited action. Likewise, merely under tanding that certain
type of behaviors are required or prohibited is not ufficient to ensure the required behavior or to prevent proscribed behaviors. To have an effect on behavior, a rule mu t be supplemented (enforced if you will) with a sufficient incentive to comply. In other words, only if a rule i enforced by ome mechanism
will it have any effect on behavior. An enforcement mechani m upplie an incentive that renders unde irable any action contrary to the rule, thereby inhibiting it occurrence. So, in general, an individual i normatively constrained
if and only if he has a sufficient incentive to observe ome rule, norm, or behavioral expectation.
Perhaps the following four examples will add more clarity to the concept.
Fir t, an individual i normatively constrained if a dictator commands a certain
action and enforces it by a threat regarding which the individual has aver ive
desires, and the individual believes that violation can alway be detected. Let
the incentive be referred to a an external incentive. Second, an individual i
normatively constrained if a legal y tern pro cribes a certain action and enforce it by threats of incarceration or fines regarding which the individual ha
aver ive desire , and the individual believe that violations can always be detected. Again, the individual i normatively constrained by a rule and a sufficient external incentive. Third, an individual i normatively constrained if ome
moral principle require some action regarding which the individual has averive de ire , but he values the ocial "fabric" that the principle pre erve over
her aver ion . In thi ca e the rule i "enforced" by her value for what the rule
protect . The incentive in thi example i an internal incentive. Finally, an individual i normatively con trained if he ob erve a rule for no rea on other than
for duty, or for what he believe about the intrinsic value of following the rule .
In the e la t two cases individual have an internal incentive to follow the rule ,
and therefore, in this sen e, the rules can be aid to be enforced. The point here
is to clarify the idea that a normative con traint i con tituted by a rule (of som
type) and either by an external or by a ufficient internal incentive.
Admittedly, the di tinction between internal and external incentive i not a
precise as it could be. A deeper analy i w uld how that the intended r t rences of each have both internal and external component . However, for the pur-
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pose of an wering the two central questions of this book, we need only distinguish between incentives that are purely selfish and those that are not. A
purely selfish individual is motivated only to achieve (avoid) his own gain (los )
and to maintain his ability to do so. His gain (loss) is defined solely in terms of
his preferences for commodities. A purely selfish agent doe not care about the
relative satisfaction of others' preferences, much less anything about their relative abilities to lead satisfying lives. By contrast, a non-purely selfish individual care about others to some degree and the social practices that contribute to
their well-being. In this book, purely selfish agents respond to external incentives only, not to internal incentives. I argue that economically efficient outcomes of trade require, among other things, that agents possess internal incentives to comply with a set of moral rules. In this sense, economically efficient
outcomes of trade require morality.
In the theoretical model presented in thi book, normative con train ts are effective because incentive are viewed as alway being sufficient. Idealized
agent who recognize rules and are univer ally subject to ufficient motivations
can be construed to act in accordance with the rule , even though les than ideal
agents may not.
Defining normative con traint in thi way entails not only that a rule and
ome ufficient incentive are nece ary, but that they are al o ufficient. It may
eem that thi make the notion of being normatively con trained a non-normative concept. But it doe not. A normative con traint i defined in thi book
a nonpo itive, or non-objective. Recall that a po itive, or objective, con traint
i a limitation on the et of po ible action about which the agent ha no choice
regardless of her di po ition or de ire . On the other hand, a ufficient incentive depend only on an agent' di po ition or de ire . Had they been different
than they are, the agent could have cho en the alternative cour e of action. Thi
i exemplified by tho e people who are naturally di po ed to take action or refrain from action that norm happen to require or to prohibit. Such norm imply de cribe their pattern of behavior. From their per pective, they do not feel
con trained.
Normative con traint define an agent' admi ible trategy domain. Let me
explain. The et of action that are phy ically po ible for an agent i hi natural trategy domain. The term, natural trategy domain, i tandard in economic and game theory. But not every phy ically po ible action i rational.
Since agent are pre urned to be in trumentally rational, the normative contraint of practical rea on re trict agent ' natural trategy domain and delimit
their rational trategy domain . In other word , an agent' rational strategy domain i a ub et of hi or her natural trategy domain. ormative con traint
and convention further re trict individual ' natural trategy domain -and delimit agent ' admi ible trategy domains.
Since an agent' admi ible trategy domain i a proper ub et of an agent'
rational trategy domain, every admi ible trategy i al o a rational trategy.
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Thu , every normative con traint and convention in our model i individually
rational. Furthermore, ince what make a rule a moral rule is partially a matter of it function in achieving and su taining some concept of well-being ba ed
on the control belief of a given community, moral normative con traint are
al o collectively rational. I will how that a perfectly competitive market i a
normative framework for trade that ecure perfect competition and, therefore,
i con tituted by a et of rational constraint on the pursuit of elf-intere t.
But the moral rights of a perfectly competitive market are al o collectively
rational. They re ult from collective reasoning about goals. There are at least
two type of goals. The fir t type i a completed achievement uch as winning
the World Series. The econd type involve achieving and u taining ome kind
of condition, such as getting phy ically fit. The goal of creating a set of rule to
en ure efficient outcome of market interaction i of the econd type. It could
go like thi
We desire to achieve and maintain condition that en ure economic efficiency.
Action of type A undercut our goal, and actions of type B are
Premise:
required.
Conclusion: Therefore, none of us should take an action of type A, which
undercuts our goal, and all of u hould take actions of type B,
which are required.

Premise:

Thi piece of rea oning i collectively rational. Even though the que tion·of the
rationality of moral constraint in general is thu s clo ely related to central i ue in this book, it lie beyond it cope. Nevertheless, si nce the goal of thi
book i to pecify a sy tern of normative condition that make efficient outcome of trade pos ible, the individual and collective rationality of moral normative con traint is also e tabli hed .
In um, morality i a normative ocial practice, moral rules guide such practices, and a moral normative con traint is a limitation on an agent's range of
po sible action and is con tituted by a moral rule and a sufficient internal incentive to comply with uch norms. Such constraint are both individually and
collectively rational.

ynopsis of the Book
In hapter 2, I develop the theoretical etting required to an wer both central
question . I fir t construct a framework for analyzing ocial ituation .9 The
framework i composed of two division corre ponding to the two es ential aspect& of &ocial situations. The first division regard agent ; the econd , the ituation in which they interact. Agent are depicted in term of their prei rence
and their rationality. The Situation within which ag nt a ti d fined in t rm
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of positive and normative conditions. Each of the four ubcategorie (i.e., preferences, rationality, po itive conditions, normative condition ) involve at lea t
two variable as umptions. Alternative ocial situations are, therefore, pecified
within this framework by variou ly altering one or more of nine variable asumptions.
By the particular content given to as umptions (p 1)-(p 5 ) , I then pecify a particular type of social ituation in which agents, who are purely elfi hand fully
rational, interact in the absence of moral normative con traints; that i , they interact under pure anarchy. I call thi particular type of ocial ituation Strict
Rational Egoism. I have added the adjective, trict, to rational egoism to modify egoism so as to indicate pure selfishne in contradi tinction to the common
term rational egoism, which allows altrui tic desire and behavior .
To determine whether moral normative constraint are neces ary conditions
of efficient outcome of trade, de cription of agent mu t not involve morality
in any way, and interaction among agent mu t not be affected by any morally
relevant factor . Thu , for example, uch agents mu t be defined o a to exclude the effect of morally ignificant con traint uch a tho e attributable to
the internalization of moral norm . Therefore, I develop the concept trict rational egoi t as a purely elfi h agent rather than begin with rational egoi t ,
who are agent who may have preference that ome may view a moral. By
specifying the variable a umption in the framework, I depict Strict Rational
Egoi m, which i , therefore, a type of ocial ituation in which every agent i a
trict rational egoi t. A principle of action i derived from Strict Rational Egoi m and expre e the nece ary and ufficient condition under which a trict
rational egoi t will take action.
Notice that I am not attempting to de cribe or to model actual human behavior. I am modeling the behavior of idealized agent . I how that the abolutely, nonnormatively con trained interaction of uch fictitiou agent cannot achieve efficient outcome of trade. Then, I determine at lea t one et of
normative condition ju t ufficient to achieve uch outcome . The e condition
include a et of moral rule and a change in the agent them elve , which provide internal incentive to comply with the rule . uch incentive are not matter of practical rationality grounded in pure elfi hne . They are matter of
practical rationality grounded partially, for example, in value for other ' wellbeing or for the ocial fabric of their live . 10
Finally, I further develop the theoretical etting by examining the fact that
the pre uppo ition of the Fir t Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economic
(or Fir t Welfare Theorem) are not the a umption of Strict Rational Egoi m.
That i , alternative proof of the Fir t Welfare Theorem a ume either that competitive behavior exi t without al o indicating the mechani m that en ure it
or that the condition of a perfectly competitive market preclude efficiency-reducing action . In addition , alternative proof of the Fir t Welfare Theorem a ume the ab ence of externalitie ; that i , they a ume that there are no inten-
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tional, incidental, or accidental effect on the well-being of a con umer or the
production po ibilitie of a firm not accounted for by the market mechani m. 11
Thu , intentional, incidental, and accidental adver e effect on efficiency are
pre urned not to occur becau e the action that cau e them are a urned not to
be taken. But such effect of agent ' actions are not ruled out under Strict Rational Egoi m. That i , Strict Rational Egoi m doe not preclude the po sibility of action being taken that adver ely affect the efficiency of outcome of
trade. It doe not matter whether uch effects are either intentional, incidental,
or accidental.
The incompatibility between what the Fir t Welfare Theorem a ume and
what Strict Rational Egoi m allow points to the ambiguity regarding the role
of moral normative constraint in the First Welfare Theorem and under core
the need to examine the role of moral normative con traint . 12 Proof of the
Fir t Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics show that under certain condition every equilibrium allocation of commodities is efficient. But the central
que tion i thi : Must those conditions include moral normative constraints? If
o, then the Fir t Welfare Theorem i not a proof of the common under randing
of Adam Smith' claim regarding the Invisible Hand .
By paying clo e attention to the condition under which the proof succeeds
and by comparing these a sumption to what Strict Rational Egoi mallows, we
are in a po ition to determine under what conditions purely elfi h agents will
engage in trade and achieve efficient outcome and, thus, to specify the role of
morality in the Fir t Welfare Theorem. In ver ion of the First Welfare Theorem, morality appear to have no role because the action it preclude are either
pre urned never to be chosen or el e prevented by nonnormative factor . Thi
book clarifie the role and types of normative condition that the Fir t Welfare
Theorem and, by implication, the Invisible Hand Claim pre uppose.
In Chapter 3, I make the fir t of three claim that jointly con titute a respon e
to the fir t que tion: Can a population of strict rational egoists achieve efficient
allocations of commodities through market interaction i.n the absence of moral
normative constraints? On the ba i of the specified as umption of the framework for analyzing social ituation , I how that a population of trict rational
egoi t cannot achieve efficient allocation in the ab ence of moral normative
con traint becau e moral normative constraints are nece ary conditions of
competitive behavior. In hapter 4 and 5, I trengthen the claim by howing
that (I) trict rational egoi t have no moral incentive to comply with whatever
rules are agreed upon and (2) no mean exi t for internalizing externalitie .
There are three reason why moral normative con traint are nece ary conditions. irst, a presumption against nonmarket action entail a contradiction.
econd, under a widely accepted conception of a "perfectly competitive market," individuals ha e both an incentive and the means to violate the rule of th
process. herefore, given the derii ed principle for action (DPA), agent will
not behave competiti ely. inally, even if we alter as umptions (p 5 ) and (p 6 ) o
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that agents have maximal information-processing capabilitie and perfect information regarding every economically relevant variable, the possibility exi ts that no agent will be able to make a decision. In particular, I show that
there exi t a set of deci ion functions which are not effectively computable.
This section is technical, and the reader may wish to skip to the ection urnrnary. Thus, the answer to the first question is that a population of strict rational
egoists cannot achieve efficient allocations in the absence of moral normative
constraints.
In Chapter 4, I strengthen the re ult by showing that trict rational egoi ts
will not comply with whatever rule are agreed upon. We proceed by way of a
response to a possible objection. A pontaneous order objection might be rai ed
against the conclusion of Chapter 3, claiming that the ocial behavior of selfish
individual in a situation depicted by the pecified as urnptions of the framework will converge into regular pattern , which, in tum, will be ufficient to
produce optimal outcomes of trade. It i important to bear in mind that thi is
not a denial of the claim that orne type of moral normative constraint are nece ary conditions of Pareto efficiency. The Spontaneou Order Objection a surnes that moral normative con traint are nece sary. Rather, it denie that
Pareto-optimal equilibrium allocations are not achievable for trict rational egoi t in a ocial situation defined by premi e (p 1)-(p ).
9
In respon e to the objection, a rigorou di tinction between coordination ituation and collective action ituation i made, and the role of convention i
further developed. We ee that convention are not normative con traint . Furthermore, only moral normative con traint - partially con tituted by collective
action rule - can conv.erge agent ' trategie in collective action ituation .
Prerni e (p 1)-(p 8) define an exchange ituation, which i hown to be a collective action ituation. After di cu ing five type of po ible olution to collective action ituation , I how that the pontaneou Order Objection hold
only if there i a olution to an exchange ituation that ari e only from prerni e (p 1)-(p 8 ); that i , only if any of the five olution are internal olution .
In hort, trict rational egoi t will not comply with rule becau e exchange
ituation are collective action ituation , and of the five po ible type of olution to collective action ituation , none will be adopted by trict rational
egoi t . Therefore, the pontaneou Order Objection fail .
In Chapter 5, I augment the claim that a population of trict rational egoi t
cannot achieve efficient allocation of cornrnoditie through trade by howing
that, in the ab ence of moral normative con traint no mean e i t for internalizing externalitie . The proof of the Fir t Welfare Theorem implicitly a ume that externalitie are ab ent. A urning that extemalitie are ab ent - ju t
a a urning that every agent behave competitively - et the que tion of the
role of normative con traint a ide. I fir t clarify the term externality and di tingui h between intentional, accidental, and incidental externalitie . I how (1)
how a pecified y tern of moral normative con traint and procedure (convention ) can ecure competitive behavior and can preclude or rectify the ef-
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feet of the three types of extemalitie , (2) how moral normative constraints
converge expectation and thereby reduce transaction cost , and (3) that moral
normative constraints provide logical limit of the commodification of de ire.
I conclude that ince (1) without moral normative con traint , externalitie cannot be precluded, much les rectified, (2) that expectations will not converge,
and (3) without limits on what kinds of things can be commodified, economic
efficiency i not possible for trict rational egoi t .
In Chapter 6, I respond to the second question: What are the moral normative constraints and other normative conditions of market interaction leading
to efficient outcomes of trade? The normative presuppositions of market interaction leading to efficient outcomes include a system of moral normative contraint , a set of convention for equilibrating supply and demand, and a set of
moral normative constraints and conventions for internalizing intentional, accidental, and incidental externalities. The system of moral normative constraint is specified as a normative social practice in which
(i)

a set of moral rights - construed as a set of moral Hohfeldian position that
restrict agents ' natural and rational strategy domains - provides a moral
ba is for internalizing externalities,
(ii) each agent has some sufficient internal incentive to comply with these
rights, and
(iii) there exis~s a set of procedure~ according to which agents hold each other
responsible.

Together, the ystem and the conventions constitute one set of background preuppo itions of the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics.
In Chapter 7, I reiterate and explore the implications of the results for moral
philosophy, economics, legal theory, and political theory. In particular I explore
and defend the following claims:

Economic Theory
1. A market i an institution and perfect competition is a type of ocial interaction secured by a set of normative condition , which include moral normative constrai nts and which internalize externalities. A di tinction should
be maintained between intentional, incidental, and accidental externalities,
which are the effect of actions not governed by normative condition . It follows that a perfectly competitive market include a set of moral normative
constraints and that any proof of the Fir t Welfare Theorem pre uppo es thi
general set of normative conditions.

Political Economy and Moral Philosophy
\

2.

he Invisible Hand laim is mi staken : agent pur uing their interests mu t
also posse s internal incentive to comply with a particular et of moral
norms to achieve their 'common good'.
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Legal Theory

3. Appellate decisions based on economic efficiency mu t not ignore the moral
rights, which are efficiency' necessary conditions.
4. The moral conditions of economic efficiency et moral and logical limits on
the comrnodification of desire.

